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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of the optimal organization of delegated exper-
tise. For incentive purposes, a principal should reward an expert when his
recommendation is confirmed either by the facts or by other experts’ recom-
mendations. With a single expert, we show that the agency costs of delegated
expertise exhibit diseconomies of scale. Possible organizational responses to
this problem include basing decisions on a less than optimal amount of infor-
mation, and relying on multiple experts. We analyze the source of gains from
having multiple experts in different contracting environments corresponding
to different nexi of collusion between the principal and/or the experts.
∗We thank Mark Armstrong, Juan Carillo, Hendrik Hakenes, Li Hui, Rongkang Kang, Godfrey Keller,
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Christian Laux, Jonathan Levin, Gyo¨ngyi Lo´ra´nth, George Mailath, Eric Maskin,
Lisa Oliver, Marco Ottaviani, Jean Tirole, and Dimitri Vayanos as well as seminar participants at CERNA
Paris, ETAPE Paris, Frankfurt, HEC Paris, Institut Henri Poincare´ Paris, London Business School, the
LAMES in Sao Paulo, Munich, Oxford, Wuhan University and the Econometric Society European Meeting
2003 in Stockholm for discussions and comments. We also thank Marie-Pierre Boe´ and Cathy Wilson for
their help in preparing the manuscript. All errors are ours.
‡London Business School and CEPR.
§Universite´ de Toulouse I (GREMAQ, IDEI), Institut Universitaire de France, and CEPR.
1
1 Introduction
With scientific and technological boundaries moving constantly, decision-making has come
to rely increasingly on expertise. Decision-makers do not always have the time and skills
to gather and process information on complex issues. Instead, this task is often delegated
to experts. In this paper, we analyze the problem of motivating experts to gather and
report information through monetary compensations and organization design.
Examples of delegated expertise abound and span both the private and public spheres.
Firms routinely seek the advice of consultants to evaluate strategies. Investors follow the
recommendations of financial analysts. Public policies aimed at managing risks rely on
scientific experts as illustrated during the debates in several European countries over
nuclear programmes, transgenic plants and global warming. The architecture of govern-
ments, and most specifically of legislatures, requires that groups of legislators gather and
publicize information before legislative decision-making takes place.
How do experts really get informed? How can one ensure that the information they
provide is accurate and can indeed improve decision-making? How accountable should
experts be for their recommendations? How should one organize the delegation of exper-
tise? Should one rely on one or several experts? To address these questions, one must
realize that delegated expertise involves an incentive problem between the principal and
the expert(s), with quite specific and intriguing features. Indeed, unlike other activities
involving moral hazard, experts produce a non-verifiable output, namely information.
Therefore, experts must be given incentives not only to acquire information, but also not
to manipulate it. An efficient design of incentives for experts must therefore solve an
intricate problem mixing both moral hazard and adverse selection.
This paper studies the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts and explores
implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider the relationship
between a decision-maker (principal) and one or several agents (experts) whose task is
to gather information (signals) on the likelihood of success of a project. The project
is a priori unprofitable. However, based on the information reported by the expert(s),
the principal decides whether to undertake the project. Because information gathering
is costly for the experts, they must be motivated by incentive contracts. While the
principal and the experts are risk-neutral, the experts are assumed to be protected by
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limited liability, which limits the set of feasible contracts.
Starting with a single expert gathering a single signal, the one-expert/one-signal case,
we characterize the optimal incentive contract. If the expert recommends undertaking the
project and it fails, the expert should be punished. Under limited liability, the maximum
punishment is to receive no transfer from the principal. Instead, incentives to acquire
and report a positive signal are provided by rewards if the project succeeds. Similarly
incentives to gather and report a negative signal are provided by rewarding the status
quo. Therefore delegated expertise involves agency costs, i.e., the expert derives a rent.
We then turn to the paper’s central issue, i.e., the organization of delegated expertise.
For this, we consider that two signals can be gathered, that are independent conditional
on the project’s outcome and otherwise identical in cost and precision. This implies
constant technological returns to scale. To simplify, we first assume that both signals
have to be gathered simultaneously. The paper studies and compares the performance
and optimality of different organization forms under different contracting environments.
Specifically, we compare the agency costs arising when the principal relies on one expert
to gather both signals (the one-expert/two-signals case) and when he relies on two experts
each of which gathers one signal (the two-experts/two-signals case).
First we study the one-expert/two-signals case, and identify a key property of dele-
gated expertise: diseconomies of scale in agency costs. That is, agency costs are more
than twice as large in the two-signals as in the one-signal case. The intuition is sim-
ple. Consider an expert having already gathered one positive signal. A second signal
may turn out to conflict with the first one, in which case the project should be rejected
and the status quo implemented. To induce the expert to gather the second signal, the
contract must bias him towards the status quo if signals are conflicting. However, this
bias is costly for the principal since the expert is now tempted to recommend the status
quo while remaining uninformed. This is the source of the diseconomies of scale. Be-
cause an expert is rewarded when his assessment of a project is confirmed, he is reluctant
to acquire information that may conflict with his initial assessment of the project. The
transfers needed to motivate the expert to gather more information are increasingly costly
for the principal. To reduce agency costs, the principal may forego the benefit of more
information and make less than optimally informed decisions. In other words, a possible
response to agency costs is to distort the decision rule.
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We then analyze the two-experts/two-signals case and show that whether resorting to
two experts dominates a single expert depends on the contracting environment.
First, we consider an environment in which the principal can contract with each expert
on his report and that of the other expert, as well as on the project’s outcome. Such report-
based contracts are not possible with a single expert because reports are fully manipulable,
i.e., an adverse selection constraint is binding. With two experts, however, this constraint
is no longer binding and report-based contracts are a priori possible. This added degree
of freedom in contracting is useful for two distinct reasons. First, it allows to put all the
weight of an expert’s reward for a positive report on the state that is most informative (i.e.,
the project succeeding) and none on a less informative state (i.e., the project being rejected
following a negative report by the other expert). Second, because the signals gathered by
the two experts are correlated, report-based contracts allow to use one expert’s report to
cross-check the other’s. For both reasons, motivating each expert becomes cheaper. In
fact, the agency costs exhibit now increasing returns to scale. The optimal arrangement
is for each expert to be rewarded only if his report is confirmed by the facts and by the
other expert’s report. Interestingly, this optimal arrangement rewarding consensus has
the obvious drawback of being exposed to the possibility of horizontal collusion between
experts. If this type of collusion cannot be avoided, the principal might have to resort to
relying on a single signal at the cost of distorting the decision rule.
Second, we analyze the case of own-report-based contracts, i.e., in which the principal
can contract with each expert on the project’s outcome as well as on their report but not
on the other expert’s report. These contracts are in fact robust to the threat of vertical
collusion between the principal and the experts. In that case, two experts still dominate
a single expert, but less than under report-based contracts as there are only constant
returns to scale in agency costs.
Finally, we analyze the case in which contracts can only be signed on the project’s
outcome, but not on the reports themselves. For such outcome-based contracts, which
arise when both horizontal and vertical collusions are possible, we show that using a
single expert is optimal. This result derives from the decreasing returns to scale property:
with outcome-based contracts, each expert behaves as if he is gathering the second, more
expensive, signal.
Summarizing, the structure of agency costs for delegated expertise calls for using
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multiple experts. However, the value improvement brought about by such a management
depends critically on the scope for vertical and horizontal collusion. Without public and
transparent report procedures, it can even be counterproductive.
While the design of expertise is well studied in Administrative Law and Accounting,
economists have devoted less attention to it.2 Lambert (1985), Demski and Sappington
(1987) and Malcomson (2001) emphasize the cost of delegated expertise arising from
information gathering being non-verifiable. They characterize the optimal contract for
one expert under fairly general information structures. Instead our model is simpler
but we compare several organizations of expertise. Another difference is our focus on
the experts’ limited liability rather than risk aversion as the source of agency costs. This
makes our model more tractable, allowing extensions such as multiple signals and experts.
Osband (1989) analyzes incentives for experts who report estimates of the unknown mean
of a random signal. Unlike in our model, the principal is passive and does not take
decisions based on the estimate. Nevertheless, the reports are useful as they reduce the
principal’s loss function. Finally, experts are assumed to have private information about
their degree of expertise, an adverse selection dimension that is absent in our model.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study the design of expertise in an incomplete contracts
framework. Within our model, this incompleteness requires that contracts be outcome-
based, i.e., based on whether the project is undertaken but not on reports. Two hard
information independent signals need to be gathered and can be either positive or negative.
Having each of two experts collect one kind of signal is the only way to induce information
gathering since outcome-based contracts cannot reward a single expert for gathering con-
flicting signals. Instead of incomplete contracts, we follow a mechanism design approach.
Contracts are contingent on the experts’ reports and experts acquire signals that are a
priori identical, i.e., identically distributed and soft information. Screening remains pos-
sible because of the stochastic nature of the project. We show that conflicting evidence is
nevertheless easier to obtain with two experts. The optimal collusion-free contract is nec-
essarily report-based. With decision-based contracts, a single expert is optimal.3 Laffont
and Martimort (1999) also show that splitting information between several experts (reg-
2See Hermitte (1997) and Harrison (2001) for Administrative Law. See, among others, Baiman and
Demski (1980) for Accounting.
3It is important to stress two other differences. First, in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), decisions
yield non-random outcomes. Second, the signals are hard information, i.e., they can be concealed but
not manipulated. In their model, if information were fully manipulable as in ours, incentives could not
be provided to the expert.
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ulators) reduces agency costs. However, the agency costs arise from the experts colluding
with private interests, and not from information gathering. Another important difference
is that we consider endogenous information structures.
Our result on the benefit of having multiple experts bears also some resemblance with
the literature on the interaction between planning and implementation in organizations.4
There, it is argued that splitting information gathering and production can relax incentive
problems. Our model differs by his focus on two information gathering tasks.
A literature following Crawford and Sobel (1983) and mainly motivated by applica-
tions to Political Science, assumes that already informed experts move first and report to
the decision-maker who is not committed to a decision rule and that monetary transfers
are not feasible. This timing may be relevant to model committee organization in legisla-
tures or informational lobbying but less so in environments where the decision-maker has
a leading role in organizing information gathering. Recent papers in that line have also ar-
gued that multiple experts can generate more information, reducing the scope for pooling
and allowing fully separating equilibria.5 We depart from this literature in several ways.
We let the decision-maker move first and allow monetary incentives. We endogenize in-
formation structures and analyze how the problems of gathering and eliciting information
interact.
The one-expert/one-signal model is presented in Section 2 and analyzed in Section 3.
Section 4 studies the one-expert/two-signals case and identifies diseconomies of scale due
to agency costs. The two-experts/two-signals case is studied for report-based contracts in
Section 5, and for own-report-based and decision-based contracts in Section 6. Section 7
studies sequential information gathering. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Delegated Expertise
We consider the relationship between a decision-maker (principal) and a single agent
(expert) whose task is to gather information on the profitability of a risky project. Based
on this information, the principal decides whether to undertake the project. Both the
principal and the expert are risk-neutral. The expert is unbiased, in the sense that he is
4See Hirao (1994), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Laux (2001a), Khalil, Kim and Shin (2002) and Jeon
(2003).
5See Baron and Meirowitz (2001), Krishna and Morgan (1998), and Wolinsky (2000) for recent papers.
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a priori indifferent about whether the project is undertaken and about its outcome.6
The project’s payoff is S¯ > 0 if it succeeds, and S < 0 otherwise. Denote by ν the
a priori probability of success. Absent further information, undertaking the project is
assumed to be inefficient which introduces a bias towards the status quo in our model:7
νS¯ + (1− ν)S < 0.
For instance, one can think of the principal as being a CEO having to decide whether
to enter a new market, and using the expertise of consultants. Whether entry will prove
profitable is a priori unknown. The principal could also be a Health Agency having to
decide whether to authorize a new drug, and relying on scientists’ recommendations.
Information Structure: By incurring a personal cost ψ, the expert observes a signal
σ ∈ {σ, σ¯}.8 Denote by θ ∈ (1/2, 1] the signal’s precision defined as Proba(σ¯|S¯) =
Proba(σ|S) = θ. Hence, σ¯ is “good news” and σ “bad news” about the project.9 If the
project is undertaken, its outcome is observed. Otherwise, no further information arrives.
Notation: Denote p(σ) the likelihood of σ ∈ {σ, σ¯} and ν(σ) the probability of success
conditional on σ. For example, p(σ¯) = νθ + (1− ν)(1− θ) and ν(σ¯) = θν
νθ+(1−ν)(1−θ) .
First-Best Decision Rule: As a benchmark, consider the first-best decision rule.10
Once ψ is sunk, the optimal decision rule is to undertake the project if and only if σ = σ¯.
Hence gathering information is valuable if this is cheap enough (ψ small enough), and the
signal precise enough (θ close enough to 1). The project’s expected surplus is:
p(σ¯)
(
ν(σ¯)S¯ + (1− ν(σ¯))S)− ψ = θνS¯ + (1− θ)(1− ν)S − ψ ≥ 0.
3 Expertise and Incentives
This section describes the incentive issues arising in the principal-expert relationship.
Departing from the first-best, three contracting frictions are assumed.
6Biased experts in political contexts have been analyzed by Dur and Swank (2004) and Laux (2001a).
7The opposite case in analyzed in the Appendix. The results are similar.
8The outcome of information gathering could be random, with the expert observing a signal or nothing
with some probability. This would increase the number of possible reports by the expert (he could report
being uninformed) but would not alter the paper’s main insights.
9Indeed, for θ ∈ (1/2, 1], we have Proba(σ¯|S¯)
Proba(σ|S¯) =
θ
1−θ >
1−θ
θ =
Proba(σ¯|S)
Proba(σ|S) .
10This case corresponds to the principal being able to gather information himself or, equivalently, to
the expert’s cost of information gathering being contractible.
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Assumptions 1
• Moral hazard: Whether the expert acquires information or not is not observable.
• Limited liability: Transfers from the principal to the expert are non-negative.
• Soft information: The signal σ is not observable by other parties.
The first point implies that the expert must be given incentives to gather information.
The second implies that incentive provision is costly for the principal. Indeed, with unlim-
ited liability, the expert could be made residual claimant for the project. In particular, if
the expert’s report were positive but the project failed, he would have to make a transfer
to the principal. This is not feasible under limited liability. Instead, incentive provision
requires leaving an information rent to the expert.11 The third point implies that the ex-
pert has private information. The expert produces information which is a non-verifiable
and fully manipulable output. In particular, he can report having observed a signal even
if he did not.12
A contract for the expert consists of transfers from the principal, and decisions whether
to undertake the project based on his report σˆ on the signal. The project being risky, the
transfers can be lotteries conditional on its outcome. Of course, such lotteries are helpful
only if the project is undertaken. Otherwise, a constant transfer suffices. Formally, a
contract is a menu of lotteries on transfers and a vector of decisions depending on the
expert’s report σˆ ∈ {σ, σ¯}.
We begin by characterizing the optimal contract implementing the first-best decision
rule. This is the first step in the optimization of the decision rule itself, which we complete
later in the section. A contract implementing the first-best decision rule is summarized
by the expert’s transfers t0 if the project is rejected, t¯ if it is undertaken and succeeds,
and t if it fails. To streamline the presentation, we assume that t = 0, which is clearly
optimal (see the Appendix for a formal proof).
Note that, absent the incentive problem, the ex post information asymmetry between
the principal and the expert could be solved at no cost with a flat contract since the
11As usual under moral hazard and risk-neutrality, the incentive problem could be solved if the expert
could post an ex-ante bond equal to the rent. This would require that the expert be wealthy enough.
This solution clearly is not feasible in many cases of relevance for this paper.
12This feature distinguishes expertise from most other productive activities since output is generally
observable.
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expert is a priori unbiased. Such a flat contract would not work, however, when the
expert must be induced to gather information. Indeed, the expert may be tempted not to
gather information and report the signal implying the highest expected transfer. Therefore
the expert must be given incentives to gather information, but also to report the signal
accurately. In other words, the principal-expert relationship involves both moral hazard
ex ante and adverse selection ex post.
Summarizing, the expert should not prefer reporting σ after having observed σ¯, i.e.,
ν(σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0. (1)
not should he prefer reporting σ¯ after having observed σ, i.e.,
t0 ≥ ν(σ)t¯. (2)
The contract must also satisfy a moral hazard incentive constraint for the expert to gather
information. The expert must not prefer to remain uninformed and reporting σ, i.e.,
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ t0, (3)
or a positive report (in which case his belief remains ν), i.e.,
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ νt¯. (4)
These two constraints imply the adverse selection constraints (1) and (2).13 Intuitively,
for the expert to acquire information, a positive wedge must exist in each state of nature
between his expected transfer when being truthful and when lying. If, when informed,
the expert were indifferent between recommending to undertake or reject the project, he
would prefer not to incur the cost ψ and make an uninformed recommendation.14 The ex
post manipulability of the report is irrelevant once the expert is informed. However the
fact that information is soft allows the expert to pretend he has observed a signal, σ or
σ¯, even when he has not observed any. Therefore the signal’s manipulability affects the
moral hazard incentive constraint.
13Indeed, we can rewrite these constraints as: ν(σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0 + ψp(σ¯) and t0 ≥ ν(σ)t¯+ ψp(σ) .
14Demski and Sappington (1987) discuss a model with information gathering (ex ante moral hazard)
and production (ex post moral hazard) where productive effort is costless. They show that the latter
incentive problem does not add any incentive cost in the case of two outcomes of the productive activity.
Our result that adverse selection ex post is not a binding constraint is similar.
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Finally, the expert’s participation and limited liability constraints
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ 0, and t¯, t0 ≥ 0 (5)
being always satisfied in the environments below, they are omitted henceforth.
To implement the first-best decisions at minimum cost, the principal solves:
min
{t¯,t0}
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0
subject to (3) and (4).
Important properties of the optimal contract can be derived from the simple observa-
tion that it is defined by constraints (3) and (4) being binding. First, the expert must be
indifferent between acquiring information or not. Second, both constraints’ RHS must be
equal, i.e., t0 = νt¯, meaning that if uninformed, the expert is indifferent between recom-
mending to undertake the project or not. Finally, the expert’s expected payoff ((3)’s LHS)
must equal t0 ((3)’s RHS), his payoff if he remains uninformed and rejects the project.
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Proposition 1 The expert’s optimal incentive contract implementing the first-best deci-
sion rule rewards (resp. punishes) the expert when he recommends undertaking the project
and the project succeeds (resp. fails). The optimal transfers are as follows:
t1,1 = 0, t¯1,1 =
ψ
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1) , and t
1,1
0 = νt¯
1,1 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1) . (6)
If his report is positive, the expert is rewarded if the project succeeds and punished
otherwise, which makes him willing to learn a positive signal. The expert is also rewarded
for a negative report, which makes him willing to learn a negative signal. This simply
reflects the usual relationship in moral hazard environments, i.e., an agent’s rewards
should be positively linked with the outcomes that are most informative about his having
exerted effort, here about his having gathered information.16
15To better understand the optimal contract, a graphical representation of the principal’s problem may
be useful. See Figure 1. The set of incentive feasible contract {t0, t¯} satisfying (3) and (4) defines a cone
in the positive quadrant. Indeed, any contract can be written as t¯ = t¯1,1 + λ and t0 = t
1,1
0 + µ where
ν(σ¯)λ ≥ µ ≥ ν(σ)λ. The extreme point of this cone corresponds to {t1,10 , t¯1,1}. Since the principal’s
payoff increases when his indifference curve moves south-west, this transfer pair minimizes the principal’s
expected transfer to the expert.
16In practice, it is often the case that experts receive payments (explicit or implicit) conditionally on
whether their recommendations are confirmed by facts. For example, financial experts receive rewards
linked to the performance of the portfolio they manage on behalf of investors. Consultants and economic
experts will be hired again if their recommendations are confirmed.
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Note that an asymmetry exists between the two decisions. Undertaking the project re-
veals ex post information which might contradict the expert’s favorable recommendation,
whereas no further information arrives after the project is rejected.17
Corollary 1 The expert’s rent is given by:
U1,1 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1) .
Comparative Statics: It will prove important to note that motivating the expert is
more costly when the project is a priori more likely to succeed. Indeed, when ν increases,
the expert is more tempted to remain uninformed and recommend adopting the project
because the a priori probability that he will be rewarded is high. Moreover, the project’s
outcome is unlikely to reflect that the expert has remained uninformed. A more infor-
mative event occurs when the expert recommends the status quo. It is indeed likely that
he has gathered information. Avoiding this excessive bias towards adoption requires to
increase the status quo payoff t0 so that the expert is more willing to incur the cost of
gathering a signal that might contradict his initial assessment of the project.
The rent decreases with the signal’s precision, i.e., more precise experts are easier to
incentivize. To see this, recall that moral hazard is less of an issue when the agent’s
performance is less noisy. Here, with greater precision, a positive report is more closely
linked to the project’s success. Therefore, the project’s outcome tracks the expert’s effort
more closely and the agency cost is lower.18
Decision Rule: Having characterized the optimal contract implementing the first-best
decision rule, we now optimize the decision rule itself. Here, the only relevant alterna-
tive to implementing the first-best is never to undertake the project, which yields a zero
payoff. Indeed, by assumption, always undertaking the project yields a negative expected
payoff and is therefore dominated by never undertaking it. Moreover, it is easily shown
that the principal cannot gain by committing to sometimes reject the project despite a
17In the Conclusion, we comment on this feature and discuss how our results can be extended when
the principal can also use some ex post information even if the status quo is chosen.
18Of course, this effects holds other things equal. If the effort cost were higher for more precise experts,
the rent could increase with the signal’s precision. Denote ψ(θ) the effort cost for an expert of precision
θ. It is natural to assume ψ (1/2) = 0, i.e., uninformative signals are costless. For more precise experts
to command greater rents, it must be that ψ(θ)/(θ − 1/2) increases with θ, i.e., that the average effort
cost of a signal increases with its precision.
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positive report. The intuition is that such a policy would reduce the information available
to confirm the expert’s positive report, i.e., would imply a less precise outcome-reward
mapping. In contrast, the principal might be able to reduce agency costs by committing
to undertake the project sometimes despite a negative report. Indeed, this policy would
imply a more precise outcome-reward mapping. However, this policy has two shortcom-
ings. First, undertaking the project despite a negative signal may be too costly when
ν(σ)S¯ + (1 − ν(σ))S  0. This cost may outweigh the benefit in terms of incentive
provision. Second, such a random policy is not renegotiation-proof since it relies on the
principal taking ex post inefficient decisions.19,20
Given agency costs, information gathering is less often optimal than in the first-best.
The principal will not hire an expert and will always reject the project unless the value
of the signal exceeds the sum of the cost ψ and the agency cost, i.e., unless
θνS¯ + (1− θ)(1− ν)S − ψ − U1,1 > 0 (7)
Remark 1: For future reference, consider the asymmetric case where Proba(σ¯|S¯) 6=
Proba(σ|S). It is easily shown that both moral hazard constraints (3) and (4) remain
binding. The more general expressions for the optimal transfers and rent are:21
U1,1 = t1,10 = νt¯
1,1 =
ψ
Proba(σ¯|S¯)p(σ)− Proba(σ|S¯)p(σ¯) . (8)
Remark 2: While we focus on monetary incentives, in many cases of practical im-
portance, experts’ incentives partly stem from career concerns. Our model can be easily
reinterpreted to account for such concerns. Take for instance t = pB with p the probability
of the expert’s reputation improving, and B his private benefit from good reputation.22
19Obviously, renegotiation is not an issue following a positive report.
20Note however that in more complex models such as those we investigate in Section 4, the optimal
set of states of nature in which the project is undertaken under asymmetric information may be different
from that under complete information. In this section, we consider a one-dimensional signal, reducing this
set means never undertaking the project and increasing this set means always undertaking the project.
Section 4 shows than when the expert gathers a multidimensional signal, the decision rule can be distorted
in a less trivial way. See also Malcomson (2001).
21The RHS of (8) can be written as νψp(σ¯)p(σ)(ν(σ¯)−ν(σ)) which is positive since ν(σ¯) > ν(σ).
22See Gromb and Martimort (2003) for a model with endogenous career concerns for experts.
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4 One Expert with Two Signals
4.1 Model
Assume now that the expert can gather simultaneously two signals, (σ1, σ2) ∈ {σ, σ¯}2,
that are independently distributed, and have the same precision θ and cost ψ.23,24 Hence
the cost of gathering two signals of equal precision θ is twice that of gathering one signal,
i.e., we assume constant returns to scale for the information gathering technology.
Denote p(σ1, σ2) the probability of observing (σ1, σ2) and ν(σ1, σ2) the conditional
probability of success, e.g., p(σ¯, σ¯) = θ2ν + (1− θ)2(1− ν) and ν(σ¯, σ¯) = θ2ν
θ2ν+(1−θ)2(1−ν) .
Under our assumptions, undertaking the project is efficient only if both signals are
positive. Instead, with conflicting signals, Bayesian updating leads to maintaining the
prior belief, under which the status quo is efficient.25
First-Best Decision Rule: Gathering two signals is efficient if:
−θ(1− θ)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ. (9)
The LHS is the benefit of a second signal: rejecting the project when the second signal
contradicts a first positive one, i.e., with probability p(σ¯, σ) = θ(1− θ). The RHS is the
cost of gathering the second signal. Under condition (9), the principal’s strategy can be
interpreted as a precautionary behavior. The project is undertaken only if all evidence
that can be gathered is favorable.
4.2 Diseconomies of Scale
Assume now that information gathering is delegated to an expert. An incentive scheme
must specify a decision rule and the expert’s payment depending on his two reports σˆ1 and
σˆ2. Indeed, optimal contracts should use all the information available, i.e., the project’s
outcome as well as the expert’s two reports. However, not all such contracts are feasible.
23For instance, the expert may be a consultant who can conduct two market studies to assess whether
entry in a new market will be profitable.
24The simultaneous timing corresponds to cases where the principal cannot control the timing of reports
or, alternatively, where time constraints make it impossible to learn information sequentially. Our initial
focus on simultaneous information gathering makes also the interaction between the expert’s two tasks
easier to present. Section 7 studies sequential information gathering and the robustness of our results.
25Indeed, ν(σ¯, σ) = θ(1−θ)νθ(1−θ)ν+(1−θ)θ(1−ν) = ν.
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Indeed, when at least one report is negative, the status quo is efficient. Therefore, all
transfers when σˆ1 = σ or σˆ2 = σ must be equal. Otherwise, the expert would always
make the report yielding the highest transfer. Therefore, signal manipulability limits the
set of feasible contracts. The expert’s reward can be based on the decision to undertake
the project or not, and the project’s outcome, but not on the way this decision is taken.
Lemma 1 With a single expert gathering two signals, contracts must be outcome-based,
i.e., transfers are contingent only on the project’s outcome (success, failure or rejection),
not on the reports (σˆ1, σˆ2).
Denote by t0 the transfer for all reports yielding the status quo, and by t¯ that if the
project is undertaken and succeeds.
Three other adverse selection incentive constraints must be considered. First, the
expert should prefer reporting (σ¯, σ¯) when this is what he observed,
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0. (10)
Conversely, the expert should not prefer reporting (σ¯, σ¯) after observing conflicting signals,
t0 ≥ ν(σ¯, σ)t¯, (11)
or two negative signals,
t0 ≥ ν(σ, σ)t¯. (12)
Clearly, constraint (11) implies constraint (12): if the expert prefers the status quo given
conflicting signals, he also does given two negative ones.
Moral hazard incentive constraints are slightly more complex than in the one-signal
case. Indeed, the expert has a third alternative to gathering both signals: he can gather
only one signal. If he observes a single signal, his recommendation takes it into account.
Therefore, the moral hazard incentive constraint can be written as:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ max{t0, νt¯, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ}. (13)
The new term on the RHS captures the expert’s expected payoff when he bases his
recommendation on only one signal.26
26This new term should be p(σ¯) max{t0, ν(σ¯)t¯}+p(σ) max{t0, ν(σ)t¯}−ψ. However, if max{t0, ν(σ¯)t¯} =
max{t0, ν(σ)t¯} the constraint is not binding as it is superseded by one of the other two. Note also that,
as before, the expert must also accept the contract, p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − 2ψ ≥ 0, and again
this constraint holds as a result of the moral hazard and limited liability constraints.
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Diseconomies of Scale: To build intuition, assume that the principal simply scales up
the optimal contract {t¯1,1, t1,10 } of the one-signal case, i.e., offers {t¯, t0} = {2t¯1,1, 2t1,10 }.
With constant returns to scale in agency costs, this scheme would certainly be optimal in
the two-signal case. This scheme is easily shown to satisfy the adverse selection incentive
constraints since t1,10 = νt¯
1,1. Consider now the moral hazard constraints. The expert
is easily shown to be indifferent between gathering two signals and none (and making
any report) as his expected payoff is 2t1,10 in both cases. Instead, if the expert gathers
only one signal, he gets 2(p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯1,1 + p(σ)t1,10 ) − ψ = 2t1,10 + ψ. Therefore the expert
will acquire and base his recommendation on only one signal. To induce him to gather a
second signal, the transfers t1,10 and t¯
1,1 must be modified.
The direction in which the contract has to change is easily seen. Indeed, the project
is undertaken too often as the expert recommends undertaking the project based on one
positive signal. To avoid this problem, the expert must be induced to learn information
that may contradict his initial positive assessment. This is done by raising t0.
To formalize this argument, we now solve the principal’s problem below:
min
{t¯,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0
subject to (10) to (13).
Proposition 2 If one expert is to gather two signals, the optimal incentive contract is:
t1,2 = 0,
νθ(2− θ)
1− p(σ, σ) t¯
1,2 = t1,20 =
(2− θ)ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)(1− θ) .
The contract is biased towards the status quo, i.e., t1,20 > νt¯
1,2.
The logic is as in the one-signal case. To gather information, the expert must be
rewarded for reporting good news that is confirmed by the project’s success. Instead, he
is not rewarded if the project fails. The status quo is also rewarded to elicit bad news.
As suggested above, the optimal contract should be biased towards the status quo.
Corollary 2 If the expert gathers two signals, his rent can be written as:
U1,2 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Infra-marginal rent
+
ψ/p(σ¯)
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal rent
. (14)
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This expression has a simple intuition. The problem of gathering two signals can be
decomposed into that of gathering a first (infra-marginal) signal, and that of gathering
a second (marginal) one. To get the expert to gather the first signal, he needs to be
given the infra-marginal rent U1,1 as in the one-signal case. This is the first term of the
expression. To understand the second term, consider now the expert having gathered
(but not yet observed because the decisions to gather each signal are simultaneous) the
first signal and deciding whether to acquire the second. If the first signal turns out to
be negative, the project is rejected irrespective of the second signal. Hence the second
signal is pivotal only if the first signal turns out to be positive. In that case, the expert’s
updated belief is ν(σ¯). Moreover, the second signal mattering only with probability p(σ¯)
amounts to the cost of acquiring it being ψ/p(σ¯). The marginal rent is thus the rent
derived in the one-signal case if the prior is ν(σ¯) and the cost is ψ/p(σ¯).
The rent corresponding to the marginal signal exceeds that for the infra-marginal
signal. There are two reasons for this. First, the prior is more optimistic, i.e., ν(σ¯) > ν,
which implies a higher rent than in the one-signal case. Second, the effective information
gathering cost is greater, i.e., ψ/p(σ¯) > ψ, as the expert is more reluctant to acquire a
signal less likely to matter.
The agency cost of inducing an expert to gather two signals is strictly more than
twice that of inducing him to gather only one signal. Hence, even though the information
gathering technology exhibits constant returns, agency costs exhibit diseconomies of scale.
This is an important result that is central to the rest of our analysis.
Proposition 3 Delegated expertise to a single expert exhibits diseconomies of scale due
to agency costs: U1,2 > 2U1,1.
There are two main difficulties in designing the contract, related to the adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard aspects of the problem.
First, unlike in the one-signal case, some adverse selection constraints are binding.
Reports being manipulable, the principal cannot discriminate between the expert having
observed conflicting signals and his having observed two negative signals. The transfers
for all reports yielding the status quo must be equal. Contracts must be outcome-based.
Second, consider the moral hazard problem. Note first that the expert can deviate by
gathering either only one or no signal. Because two conflicting signals leave the expert’s
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beliefs unchanged (ν(σ¯, σ) = ν), the adverse selection incentive constraint (11) implies
that, if uninformed, the expert is weakly biased towards the status quo. Suppose instead
that the contract is such that, if uninformed, the expert is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the project, i.e., t0 = νt¯ as in the one-signal case. On the one hand, after
observing a positive first signal, the expert is biased against the status quo. It is therefore
more costly to motivate him to acquire a second signal that may turn out to be negative
and reverse the decision. To avoid this, the contract must increase the attractiveness of
acquiring a second signal when the first one is positive. This can only be achieved by
increasing t0, the transfer for the status quo. This implies that if he chose to remain
uninformed, the expert would be strictly biased towards the status quo, i.e., t0 > νt¯. On
the other hand, if the expert has observed a first negative signal, a second signal will not
affect the decision. This second signal is not pivotal and, in a sense, it is not rewarded
by the principal as is clear from the RHS of expression (14).
Importantly, creating such a bias towards the status quo also increases the cost of
gathering the first signal. Indeed now that the status quo is more attractive, the expert
may prefer remaining uninformed and rejecting the project. This is the externality of one
task onto the other: learning the second signal requires creating a bias towards the status
quo, which increases the agency cost of gathering the first signal.
Decision Rule: The principal induces the expert to gather a signal when its value
exceeds the sum of the cost ψ and the agency cost. Therefore, he induces the expert to
gather (at least) one signal if condition (7) holds, and also a second one only if
−θ(1− θ)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ + ψ/p(σ¯)
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) . (15)
Corollary 3 The principal can find it optimal to distort the decision rule by having the
expert gather only one signal even if two signals are first-best optimal.
When this holds, the project is undertaken too often. This shows that an optimal way
of reducing agency costs can involve distorting the decision rule, here through excessive
adoption of the project and decision-making based on partial information.
Remark 1: Our diseconomies of scale result resembles those of the multi-task agency
literature showing that incentives for one task can swamp incentives for another if both are
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insufficiently rewarded.27 In our model, inducing the gathering of one signal can reduce
the incentives to gather another one. An important difference with the multitask literature
remains: the information gathering technology is assumed to have constant returns to scale
and the substitutability between tasks is thus endogenous to the agency problem and not
imposed by the technology. Nevertheless, the main lesson of this literature still holds:
correct incentives can only be obtained by making the expert more residual claimant for
the full array of his recommendations. Under limited liability, having the expert better
internalize the contractual externality between the tasks requires raising the power of
incentives for both tasks, which leaves the expert with a large rent.
Remark 2: The two-dimensional signal Σ = (σ1, σ2) takes only two relevant values:
either Σ = Σ¯ = (σ¯, σ¯) and the project is undertaken, or Σ = Σ ∈ {(σ¯, σ), (σ, σ¯), (σ, σ)}
and it is rejected. For decision purposes, it is as if the expert gathered a one-dimensional
signal, with Proba(Σ¯|S¯) = θ2 and Proba(Σ|S) = θ(2−θ). So, is the two-signal model only
a special case of the one-signal model? If yes, the agency cost would be as in expression
(8), the signal-gathering cost being 2ψ instead of ψ. It is easily shown that
Proba(Σ¯|S¯)p(Σ)− Proba(Σ|S¯)p(Σ¯) = (1− ν)(2θ − 1).
Therefore, the rent would be 2ψ
(1−ν)(2θ−1) and the scaled-up contract {2t¯1,1, 2t1,10 } would
induce the expert to gather this signal. This, however, is strictly less than the actual rent
U1,2, the difference arising from the expert being also able to deviate by gathering only
one signal. The two-signal model is no special case of the one-signal model.
5 Two Experts: Report-Based Contracts
We now investigate the effects of having each of two experts, A and B, privately observe
only one signal. For instance, a firm may call upon two consulting firms to undertake
market studies before deciding to enter a new market. For a public decision whether to
allow a new drug, the Health agency aggregates the recommendations of several experts.
We focus on the case where the experts make simultaneous reports, not knowing the
other expert’s effort, signal, or report. Again we first study contracts implementing the
27See Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) for a model with a risk averse agent and Laux (2001b) for a
model with limited liability.
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first-best decision rule, i.e., the project is undertaken only if both reports are positive,
and optimize the decision rule later.
5.1 Optimal Contracts
Without loss of generality, we assume that both experts receive the same contract. The
experts’ common transfer is t¯ if the project succeeds, and t0 for the status quo. Note that,
contrary to the single expert case, the status quo can be rewarded differently depending
on how it is reached: in case of conflicting reports, the expert reporting good (resp. bad)
news receives t1 (resp. t2), and each expert receives t0 when both news are bad.
When an expert observes σ¯, the Bayesian adverse selection incentive compatibility
constraint can be written as:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t1 ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)t0. (16)
When the expert observes σ, the constraint can be written as:
p(σ¯|σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t1. (17)
An expert’s moral hazard incentive constraint is now:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)(t1 + t2) + p(σ, σ)t0 − ψ
≥ max{p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t1, p(σ¯)t2 + p(σ)t0}. (18)
For the same reason as in the one-signal/one-expert case, the moral hazard incentive
constraints imply those of adverse selection which we omit in what follows.
Finally, the relevant limited liability constraints are:
t1, t2 ≥ 0. (19)
The principal’s program is now:28
min
{t¯,t1,t2,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)(t1 + t2) + p(σ, σ)t0
subject to (16) to (19).
28Each expert’s participation constraint can be written as: p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+p(σ¯, σ)(t1 +t2)+p(σ, σ)t0−
ψ ≥ 0. It is implied by the moral hazard constraints and is thus omitted in what follows.
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Proposition 4 With report-based contracts, if each of two experts is to gather one signal,
the optimal symmetric incentive contract does not reward experts for conflicting reports.
The optimal transfers are given by:
t2,2 = t2,21 = t
2,2
2 = 0, t¯
2,2 =
ψp(σ)
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ2 , and t
2,2
0 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ .
The optimal contract is similar to that of the one-expert/one-signal case. Now, how-
ever, an expert is rewarded for reports confirmed not only by the project’s outcome but
also by the other expert’s report.
With multiple experts, adverse selection no longer requires that contracts be outcome-
based. This added degree of freedom in contracting is useful for two reasons. First, it
allows to put all the weight of an expert’s reward for a positive report on the state that is
most informative (i.e., the project succeeding) and none on a less informative state (i.e.,
the project being rejected following a negative report by the other expert). That is, this
allows to set t1 = 0.
29 Second, by rewarding consensus, the principal can also increase
each expert’s incentives to become informed. This result can be best understood by ap-
pealing to the Informativeness Principle of the moral hazard literature.30 This Principle
establishes that, within a general principal-agent model with pure moral hazard, an addi-
tional signal helps the principal to provide incentives to the agent if it helps to detect the
latter’s effort.31 In our model, if expert B is obedient and truthful, his report constitutes
an endogenous signal that the principal can use to better design expert A’s incentives.
The principal infers from B’s report that A is more likely to have gathered information
when their reports coincide. For both reasons, motivating each expert becomes cheaper.
Corollary 4 With report-based contracts, if each of two experts is to gather one signal,
each expert’s rent is equal to:
U2,2 =
ψ
(1− ν(σ))(2θ − 1) . (20)
The rent is analogous to that obtained in the one-expert/one-signal case, but with
the expert’s belief being ν(σ) instead of ν. Note that since the rent decreases with the
29Note that this advantage would also arise if both signals were uncorrelated.
30See Holmstro¨m (1979) for a model with a risk averse agent.
31See Mookherjee (1984) for such a model in a multiagent framework with moral hazard.
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prior probability of success, the status quo is now relatively cheap to obtain. To better
understand expression (20), we rewrite constraint (18). Note first that an expert remaining
uninformed is rewarded for a negative report only if the other expert does so too. Hence,
his rent should be weighted by the probability of that event, p(σ). Formally, taking into
account that conflicting reports are not rewarded and dividing by p(σ), condition (18)
becomes:
p(σ¯, σ¯)
p(σ)
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t0 − ψ
p(σ)
≥ max
{
p(σ¯)
p(σ)
ν(σ¯)t¯, t0
}
. (21)
To analyze the incentives to avoid excessive adoption, suppose that the expected payment
received by the expert when both reports are positive is now received following conflicting
reports, i.e., consider a new payment t¯′ such that:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ = p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯′.
With this change of variable, condition (21) becomes:
p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯′ + p(σ|σ)t0 − ψ
p(σ)
≥ max{t0, ν(σ)t¯′}. (22)
Note that this condition is analogous to constraints (3) and (4) in the one-expert/one-
signal case, modified as follows: the expert has already observed a negative signal (i.e.,
his prior is ν(σ), not ν) and the information-gathering cost is ψ/p(σ) not ψ. This analogy
implies that the rent is ψ/p(σ)
(1−ν(σ))(2θ−1) which, multiplied by p(σ), yields expression (20).
5.2 The Benefits of Separation
Corollary 5 With report-based contracts, the principal is strictly better off with each of
two experts gathering one signal than with one expert gathering both signals: 2U2,2 < U1,2.
Moreover, excessive adoption of the project is less frequent than with a single expert.
By separating information gathering between two experts, the principal can better
control incentives for learning each signal. This cross-checking makes the status quo less
costly for the principal than if he was dealing with a single expert.
To understand why with report-based contracts two experts are better than one, note
that the rent left to each expert is now strictly below the rent U1,1 for the infra-marginal
signal in the one-expert case. Indeed, if expert A remains uninformed his expected payoff
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is less than if he was alone because with some positive probability expert B will make a
conflicting report.
Corollary 6 With report-based contracts, separation implies economies of scale due to
agency costs: 2U2,2 < 2U1,1.
Decision Rule: Finally, the principal prefers having two signals gathered by two ex-
perts when:
W 2,2 = θ2νS¯ + (1− θ)2(1− ν)S − 2ψ − 2U2,2 > W 1,1.
Agency costs being reduced under separation, the principal relies more often on a second
signal when deciding whether to undertake the project.
Remark: The parallel with multitask incentive problems is again useful. Separating
tasks between two experts and comparing their performances avoids having to give a
single expert high-powered incentives for each task. A corollary is that experts must be
given objectives in information gathering that are as focused as possible.
Increasing Technological Returns : So far the information gathering technology was
assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. In certain contexts, it is natural to assume
increasing returns to scale instead.32 This is a rationale for relying on a single expert. We
now analyze these countervailing effects. We model increasing returns by assuming that
the principal incurs a deadweight cost k per expert hired.33 Now, relying on two experts
rather than one is optimal if the savings in agency costs exceed the cost of hiring a second
expert, i.e., U1,2 − 2U2,2 ≥ k. The following is easily obtained.
Proposition 5 With a cost k per expert, the principal finds it optimal to rely on two
experts rather than one when the increasing technological returns to scale in information
gathering are limited (k small enough), and the project is a priori likely to succeed (ν large
enough).
32As an example, one leading argument in favor of an Antitrust general agency rather than sectoral
regulators is that the former’s experience in one field may be useful in others.
33An alternative would be to assume that the signal gathering cost is concave in the number of signals.
The model considered here is simpler in that it avoids any interaction between the increasing returns to
scale and the incentive problem.
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5.3 Horizontal Collusion Between Experts
5.3.1 Implicit Horizontal Collusion and Multiple Equilibria
A problem with the optimal report-based contract is that it admits other less desirable
equilibria of the overall game of information gathering and reporting.
Proposition 6 The optimal symmetric report-based contract with two experts has two
other equilibria in which the experts remain uninformed and both make either positive or
negative reports.
If B remains uninformed and reports bad news, A’s best response is to do the same.
Indeed, even if he observed a good signal A would never report it since conflicting reports
are not rewarded. As a result, A is better off remaining uninformed and reporting bad
news. Hence an equilibrium exists in which both experts always report bad news, and
get a payoff t2,20 that strictly exceeds U
2,2. Similarly, another equilibrium exists in which
experts always report good news. In this equilibrium, each expert’s payoff, νt¯2,2, exceeds
U2,2 but is less than t2,20 .
34 Note that in both collusive equilibria the principal’s payoff is
negative. In the first one, although the project is never undertaken, the principal bears
the cost of paying the experts. In the second one, he also bears that of undertaking a
negative-value project.
A possible solution to this multiple equilibria problem is to move to an asymmetric
mechanism and use only one expert, i.e., to rely on a discriminatory mechanism where
the otherwise identical experts receive different schemes. We are then back to the one-
expert/one-signal case with the induced bias towards excessive project adoption.
5.3.2 Explicit Horizontal Collusion
Even if the experts adopt obedient strategies and gather information non-cooperatively,
they may still have incentives to collude explicitly ex post by manipulating their reports.35
This requires of course that communication between the experts cannot be perfectly con-
trolled and forbidden by the principal. Consider the possibility that having gathered
34Note also that these collusive equilibria do not require agents to observe each other’s effort. If this
were the case, the principal could use that shared information to build revelation mechanisms a` la Maskin
(1999) and create incentives immune to implicit collusion.
35We take the standard short-cut assumption that collusive side-contracts are enforceable.
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signals, the experts can credibly share them and coordinate on a common report.36 Their
optimal reporting strategy must maximize their joint payoff, implying the following hor-
izontal coalition-incentive constraints :
2ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t1 + t2, (23)
and
2t0 = t1 + t2. (24)
Clearly, constraint (24) is not satisfied by the optimal report-based contract.
Here, we do not solve for the optimal report-based contract that is robust to horizontal
collusion between experts. Instead, these constraints are useful in that they will motivate
our study of outcome-based contracts in Section 6.2.
6 Two Experts: Collusion-Proof Contracts
In this section, we study the organization of delegated expertise in more restrictive con-
tracting environments. Section 6.1 studies the case of own-report-based contracts, i.e., in
which the principal and an expert cannot contract on the other expert’s report. These
schemes arise when vertical collusion between the principal and an expert is possible.
Section 6.2 studies the more restrictive case of purely outcome-based contracts, i.e., in
which the principal and an expert cannot contract on either expert’s report. This restric-
tion arises when both vertical and horizontal collusion are possible. We show how the
performance of different organization forms and the optimal organization depend on how
robust the organization is to the threat of collusion.37
The various nexi of collusion studied in this section arise from limitations in the control
of the communication channels between experts or between each expert and the principal.
Those limits imply a departure the complete contract environment of Section 5.1.
36Note also that experts have no incentives to lie to each other in a report-based mechanism using
cross-checking. This validates our focus on credible disclosure to analyze collusion in more general
mechanism. Another motivation may be that information is internally verifiable between experts although
not externally verifiable to use the expressions coined by Baron and Besanko (1999) in another context.
37Note that since all contracts are outcome-based in the one-expert case, we only need to analyze the
two-expert case.
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6.1 Own-Report-Based Contracts
In this section, we assume that the principal and each expert can contract on the project’s
outcome and the expert’s report, but not on the other expert’s report. Such own-report-
based mechanisms are robust to the threat of vertical collusion between the principal
and an expert is possible. Indeed, the optimal report-based contract is not robust to the
possibility of vertical collusion. Suppose that the reports are initially secretly made to
the principal and publicized by him only once a decision has been taken. If both initial
reports are negative, the principal should make a transfer t0 to each expert. Instead, he
can bribe one of the experts into switching to a positive report, and thus avoid making the
transfer to the other expert.Therefore, the possibility of vertical collusion implies that an
expert’s transfer following a negative report be independent of the other expert’s report.
Note that this type of collusion can only occur when the project must be rejected.
Indeed publicizing conflicting reports when both signals are positive changes the decision.
Instead, reporting conflicting signals when the status quo must be chosen is a feasible
alternative which does not change the decision rule.38
Lemma 2 A contract is robust to vertical collusion between the principal and one expert
if and only if it is own-report-based, i.e., if and only if
t2 = t0. (25)
If vertical collusion is possible, the principal’s problem can be written as:
min
{t¯,t1,t2,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)t1 + p(σ)t0,
subject to (16) to (19) and (25).
Of course, constraint (25) is binding. Intuitively, it is still optimal to punish an expert
who reports recommending a project when the other does the reverse and t1 = 0. The
principal’s problem can then be simplified by replacing the only positive payment t¯ by an
38One may wonder whether collusion between the principal and either agent could also be used to
change the decision whether to undertake or not the project. Clearly, it may be suboptimal to reject
a project if both signals are positive if the expected return from it is sufficiently large. When this is
the case, collusion between the principal and either expert consists for the principal in minimizing the
payments made to the other expert for a given decision.
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expected reward t¯′ condition on having reported a positive signal:
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯′ = p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ or t¯′ = θt¯.
Therefore the principal’s problem is formally the same as with a single expert.
Proposition 7 The optimal own-report-based contract implementing the first-best deci-
sion rule is such that
t¯2,2∗ =
ψ
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1)θ , t
2,2∗
1 = 0, t
2,2∗
0 = t
2,2∗
2 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1) .
Each expert’s rent is:
U2,2∗ =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1) .
In other words, the increasing returns due to agency costs with two experts are de-
stroyed by the possibility of vertical collusion. Those increasing return rely on the prin-
cipal’s ability to commit to making public and non-manipulable reports.
Corollary 7 Under the possibility of vertical collusion between the principal and each
expert, agency costs imply constant returns to scale, i.e., U2,2∗ = U1,1.
6.2 Outcome-Based Contracts
We now focus on outcome-based contracts, i.e., we assume that reports are not con-
tractible. This set of contracts is defined by t1 = t2 = t0. This restriction arises naturally
when both vertical and horizontal collusion are possible. Indeed, remark that constraints
(24) and (25) define outcome-based contracts. With t1 = t2 = t0, each expert’s moral
hazard incentive constraint can be written as:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ (1− p(σ¯, σ¯))t0 − ψ ≥ max{t0, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0}, (26)
which is easily shown to imply constraint (23), and the adverse selection constraints.39
39When an expert observes σ¯, the Bayesian adverse selection incentive constraint can be written as:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ + p(σ|σ¯)t0 ≥ t0. When the expert observes σ, the constraint is: t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ, σ¯)t¯ +
p(σ|σ)t0. Note that these constraints use conditional expectations since each expert evaluates the prob-
ability that the other expert observes either signal conditionally on his own signal. It is easy to check
that these constraints are the same as constraints (10) and (11) with a single expert.
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Lemma 3 The optimal contract implementing the first-best decision rule and robust to
both vertical and horizontal collusion is the optimal outcome-based contract (i.e., such that
t1 = t2 = t0) satisfying the moral hazard incentive constraint (26).
This result implies that any departure from constant returns to scale due to agency
cost can be seen as arising from the possibility of horizontal collusion. They are thus
due to the impossibility for the principal to control horizontal communication between
experts.
The problem is similar to that of the one-expert/one-signal case.
Proposition 8 The optimal outcome-based contract implementing the first-best decision
rule is such that:
t¯2,2∗∗ =
ψ/p(σ¯)
ν(σ¯)(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) and t
2,2∗∗
0 =
ψ/p(σ¯)
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) .
Each expert’s rent is:
U2,2∗∗ =
ψ/p(σ¯)
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) .
The intuition is simple. Each expert’s rent corresponds to the second term in expres-
sion (14)’s RHS, i.e., the rent left to a single expert for the marginal signal. Indeed, in
equilibrium, each expert expects the other to gather information and report it truthfully.
Therefore each expert behaves as if he were gathering the marginal signal.
Corollary 8 With outcome-based contracts, the principal is strictly better off with one
expert gathering both signals than with each of two experts gathering only one signal:
2U2,2∗∗ > U1,2.
Outcome-based contracts although a priori attractive because they are immune col-
lusion increase too much the agency cost. Using a centralized expertise procedure is a
means of avoiding hidden gaming between the players that a decentralized procedure
would allow. Designing a playing field for multiple experts that is robust to any kind of
collusion is thus excessively costly.
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7 Sequential Information Gathering
So far, the experts were assumed to make simultaneous reports. In fact, since one negative
signal suffices to reject the project, simultaneity involves an inefficient duplication of
the information gathering cost. To avoid that problem, the decision-maker may rely on
sequential information gathering. In that setting, the decision to gather a second signal
can be conditioned on the first report. As we will check below (see Section 7.1), this
timing is optimal in a first-best environment.
Of course, this sequential timing is less valuable under time constraints or when delays
frustrate the principal’s enjoyment of the project’s flow return. To abstract from these
issues, the principal and the experts are assumed not to discount the future and the
project returns are realized after information gathering.
7.1 First-Best
The value of a second signal is that (expected) losses are avoided if the second signal
conflicts with the first one, which occurs with probability p(σ|σ¯). Therefore, gathering a
second signal is efficient if and only if:
−p(σ|σ¯)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ. (27)
Note that p(σ|σ¯) = θ(1−θ)
θν+(1−θ)(1−ν) > θ(1− θ) so that condition (27) is easier to satisfy than
the corresponding condition (9) for simultaneous reports. Therefore sequential informa-
tion gathering strictly dominates simultaneous information gathering.
7.2 One Expert
We first study the one-expert case. The expert receives t¯ if the project is undertaken and
succeeds, and t1 (resp. t2) if his first (resp. second) report σˆ1 (resp. σˆ2) is negative. Note
that unlike in the simultaneous case, t1 and t2 can differ. Finally, we assume that the
principal can fully commit to this contract.40
First, consider the expert’s incentives to gather a second signal when he has observed
and reported (truthfully in equilibrium) σ1 = σ¯. This ex post moral hazard constraint is
40It is easily shown that the optimal contract found below is sequentially optimal.
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similar to constraints (3) and (4) with updated probabilities for both states:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t2 − ψ ≥ max{t2, ν(σ¯)t¯}. (28)
As before, these constraints imply the adverse selection incentive constraints on σ2.
Consider now the expert’s incentives to report σ1 truthfully. Suppose first that σ1 = σ¯.
The expert must prefer reporting a good signal, in which case the principal will ask for a
second signal, rather than reporting a bad one, in which case the project is rejected, i.e.,
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t2 − ψ ≥ t1. (29)
Suppose now that σ1 = σ. If the expert reports a good signal, under condition (28),
he will find it optimal to always report σ2 = σ. Intuitively, condition (28) implying the
adverse selection constraints, if the expert prefers the status quo when (σ1, σ2) = (σ¯, σ),
he also does when (σ1, σ2) = (σ, σ). Hence if the expert lies in the first stage, he will not
gather a second signal and will always report σ2 = σ.
41 By doing so, the expert receives
t2. Therefore truthful reporting of σ1 = σ requires:
t1 ≥ t2. (30)
Finally, the ex ante moral hazard incentive constraint for σ1 can be written as:
p(σ¯)(p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t2 − ψ) + p(σ)t1 − ψ ≥ max{t1, t2, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t2 − ψ}.
(31)
The RHS reflects that the relevant alternatives are to recommend the status quo either
in the first or in the second stage or base the recommendation on only one signal.42
The optimal contract is now the solution to the problem:43
min
{t¯,t1,t2}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)t2 + p(σ)t1
subject to (28) and (31).
Proposition 9 With sequential information gathering and a single expert, the optimal
incentive contract implementing the first-best decision rule is such that the expert’s payoff
41Formally, condition (28) implies that t2 > ν(σ¯, σ)t¯ = νt¯ > ν(σ, σ)t¯.
42Gathering one signal and lying in at least one state of nature is a dominated strategy since it yields
max{t2, νt¯} − ψ and the agent could get more by recommending the status quo at the second stage and
not gathering the signal.
43As before the ex ante participation constraint of the expert and limited liability constraints on the
remaining transfers will be satisfied and are thus omitted.
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for recommending the status quo is independent of whether this recommendation is made
at the first or at the second stage. The optimal non-zero transfers are:
t¯1,2S =
ψ
ν(1− ν)(2θ − 1)
(
1 +
p2(σ¯)
θ(1− θ)
)
,
t1,2S1 = t
1,2S
2 =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)
(
1 +
p(σ¯)
1− θ
)
.
The key difficulty in inducing a single expert to gather information sequentially is
related to that of the simultaneous signals case. Once the expert has learned and reported
a positive signal, he updates his beliefs in favor of the project. To induce him to gather
a second signal that might contradict the first one, the status quo transfer t2 must be
increased. However, by condition (30), the first stage status quo transfer t1 must also be
raised accordingly. Otherwise, the expert may be tempted to make a first positive report,
inducing the principal to request further investigation, only to make a negative report in
the second stage. Therefore, the second stage incentive problem exerts an externality on
that in the first stage, making it harder to elicit a rejection on the basis of a single negative
signal. The adverse selection constraint (30) implies that the transfer for the status quo
is independent of how it is reached. The optimal contract is again outcome-based, as in
the case of simultaneous reports.
Decision Rule: Inducing search for the second signal is optimal if:
−p(σ|σ¯)(νS¯ + (1− ν)S) ≥ ψ + ψ
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1) ,
which is harder to satisfy than condition (27) under the first-best. Therefore, the principal
can find it optimal to settle for a decision based on partial information.
Comparison with Simultaneous Information Gathering: With sequential information
gathering, the expert’s rent is:
U1,2S =
ψ
(1− ν)(2θ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Infra-marginal rent
+p(σ¯)
ψ/p(σ¯)
(1− ν(σ¯))(2θ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal rent
. (32)
The expression of the rent given by expression (32) is intuitive. To gather two signals
sequentially, the expert must first receive the rent corresponding to the infra-marginal
signal and then, only if this first signal is positive, the rent corresponding to the marginal
signal. The status quo is less costly than under simultaneous information gathering be-
cause the marginal rent is left less often.
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Corollary 9 If a single expert is used, agency costs are lower under sequential than under
simultaneous information gathering: U1,2S < U1,2.
7.3 Two Experts
The principal could instead rely on a different expert for each stage of information gath-
ering. In that case, the status quo can be rewarded differently depending on whether it is
reached on the basis of the first report by A or on the basis of the second report by B. In
fact, the adverse selection constraint (30) is no longer binding. Expert A can no longer
hide bad news in the first stage so as to secure a rent in the second.
First, consider expert B. He is called upon only following a positive report by expert
A. Therefore his rent is as in the one-signal/one-expert case (with the updated belief
ν(σ¯)), i.e., USB =
ψ
(1−ν(σ¯))(2θ−1) . This rent is only paid when A reports σ1 = σ¯, i.e., with
probability p(σ¯).
Consider now expert A. There is no reason to reward him when the decision to reject
the project is based on B’s negative report (σˆ2 = σ). Therefore, the ex ante moral hazard
incentive constraint for A is:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t1 − ψ ≥ max{t1, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯}.
This defines two constraints that are binding at the optimum. The transfers to A are thus
t¯A =
ψ
(1−ν)νθ(2θ−1) and t1A =
ψ
(1−ν)(2θ−1) , and A’s rent is given by U
S
A =
ψ
(1−ν)(2θ−1) . This
rent is the same as in the one-expert/one-signal case, i.e., the principal is able to control
A at the same cost as if this expert was alone. The incentive problems in both stages
are disentangled and the principal is facing a sequence of independent incentive problems.
Of course, the two experts’ rents differ because the beliefs differ in both stages. It is
easy to check that USB > U
S
A because ν(σ¯) > ν. Expert B must be given higher-powered
incentives because he is more optimistic about the project as a result of the first report
and it becomes harder to induce him to gather information that may favor the status quo.
7.4 The Benefits of Separation
Adding the experts’ rents and comparing with the one-expert case, we get the following.
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Proposition 10 Under sequential information gathering, the principal is strictly better
off implementing the first-best decision rule with two experts rather than one expert: USA +
p(σ¯)USB < U
1,2S. Moreover, an early acceptance of the project is less frequent than with a
single expert.
Since agency costs are reduced using two experts rather than one, relying on such
an organization allows a better implementation of the precautionary objectives of the
principal. More precisely, with two experts acting sequentially, the principal faces the
same agency cost as with a single expert gathering the two signals simultaneously without
having to duplicate the fixed cost of information gathering since the second signal is only
gathered to confirm an initial positive assessment.
Because the gain of gathering a second signal with a second expert in this sequential
environment is weighted by the probability that the first signal is positive, decreasing
returns in agency costs are weaker than with simultaneous reports.
It is interesting to note that the sequential timing is also robust to the threat of
collusion. By design, the second expert is only called upon after a first favorable (public)
report and the scope for both vertical and horizontal collusion disappears.
8 Conclusion
For incentive purposes, an expert should be rewarded only if his recommendation is con-
firmed by facts or by other experts’ recommendations. This principle is at the source of
diseconomies of scale due to agency cost of delegated expertise and justifies using multi-
ple experts. We analyzed these agency costs and stressed that, under both vertical and
horizontal collusion, a multi-expert procedure may be counterproductive.
The general insights developed here could be applied to several settings such as Po-
litical Science, Administrative Law or Corporate Governance. In Political Science for
instance, lobbyists are often viewed as experts eager to convey information to influence a
decision-maker because they have a stake in that decision. This assumption departs from
that used in the above model where experts are unbiased. Such biased preferences could
be easily modeled by introducing a non-transferable private benefit for the expert of doing
(or not) the project. Those benefits of course provide part of the expert’s incentives to
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gather information. If the expert is a priori biased in favor of the project, inducing him to
gather information against (resp. favorable to) the project is easier (resp. harder). These
biases affect the incentive problems but not our qualitative results.44
Several other extensions could be analyzed at a general level. First, one may be
interested in externalities across principal-expert pairs. In our framework, if the status
quo is chosen by the decision-maker, no further information arrives to confirm or not this
choice. In some environments, the principal can observe the outcome of similar projects,
e.g., undertaken by other principal-expert pairs even when he decides not to undertake
the project. Think for instance of the expert as an analyst who brings information to
a first investor who decides to invest or not in a risky asset. Other investors may have
received information from their own analysts who pushed them to invest and the price of
this asset brings information to the first investor. In this setting, the optimal incentive
scheme should specify transfers for the status quo which depend on that asset price. The
expert should be punished if he recommends not to undertake an investment which turns
out to be valuable for other investors.
Second, in our model the expert’s degree of expertise is common knowledge. This may
be a good representation of the relationship between a decision-maker and experts with
well-established reputations but more questionable for short-term relationships. When
adverse selection on the degree of expertise is an issue, the incentive contract has a new
objective which is to elicit that information from the expert.45 As experts are of a better
quality, one may expect their predictions to be more often confirmed by facts. Therefore,
screening requires to use less often than what would be first-best optimal the prediction
of bad experts and to rely on partial information. In this environment, using multiple
experts may reduce agency costs and induce less costly revelation of types by threatening
each expert to rely on the recommendations of others.
Third, in a more dynamic setting, part of the current incentives of an expert may be
affected by his desire to influence the principal’s perception of his ability. Whether the
monetary incentives, on which this paper focuses, are complements or substitutes to these
implicit incentives is an open question.46 One could also study how competition between
44See e.g. Laux (2001a).
45See Osband (1989) for a related model.
46For some investigation of those issues, see Gromb and Martimort (2003).
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experts affects their reputation building incentives.47 Indeed, experts may not only care
about their reputation vis-a-vis the principal but also vis-a-vis other experts and may
compete to be opinion leaders.
It may also be interesting to study more complex environments where experts incen-
tives are not designed by a single principal but by experts with stakes in the decision. For
example, in the judicial system, advocates are hired to gather and report information by
biased parties, not by the impartial court. How these biased incentives for information
gathering interact is an avenue of research that we plan to investigate in the future.
Finally, it may be interesting to study how delegated expertise interacts with other
tasks. For instance, should the same agent decide whether to undertake a project and
implement that project? Should an agent implementing a project also decide on its
orientation (e.g., termination)? These questions are relevant in a broad range of areas
such as Corporate Governance, Public Policy, etc.48 We leave them for future research.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In this Appendix, we consider any scheme {t¯, t, t0}, i.e., we do
not impose t = 0. The principal’s problem is then:
min
{t¯,t,t0}
p(σ¯)(ν(σ¯)t¯+ (1− ν(σ¯))t) + p(σ)t0
subject to
ν(σ¯)t¯+ (1− ν(σ¯))t ≥ t0 + ψ
p(σ¯)
, (A.1)
t0 ≥ ν(σ)t¯+ (1− ν(σ))t+ ψ
p(σ)
, (A.2)
t ≥ 0. (A.3)
(5) are easily shown to be satisfied, and omitted in what follows. Because ν(σ¯) > ν(σ),
one can keep the expected transfer constant and (A.1) unchanged, and relax constraint
(A.2) by reducing t. Hence, (A.3) is binding. The remaining constraints, (A.1) and (A.2),
define a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space, and the optimum is reached at
its origin, i.e., when both constraints are binding.
Proof of Proposition 2: (13) can be written as a two constraints:
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0 + 2 ψ
p(σ¯, σ¯)
, (A.4)
t0 ≥ νt¯+ ψ
p(σ¯, σ)
. (A.5)
(A.4) implies (10) and (A.5) implies both (11) and (12). Hence (A.4) and (A.5) define
then a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space, and the optimum is reached at
its extreme point.
Proof of Proposition 4: The moral hazard incentive constraint can be rewritten as::
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t1 ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)t0 + ψ
p(σ¯)
, (A.6)
and
p(σ¯|σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t1 + ψ
p(σ)
. (A.7)
Consider first the following problem: for a given value T1 of p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ + p(σ|σ¯)t1,
keeping both the LHS of (A.6) and the expected transfer unchanged, what is the value of
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t1 minimizing the RHS of (A.7)? We solve:
min
{t¯,t1}
p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t1
subject to
T1 = p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t1 (A.8)
t1 ≥ 0. (A.9)
This problem can be rewritten as:
min
{t1}
p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)(T1 − p(σ|σ¯)t1) + p(σ|σ)t1
subject to (A.9).
The coefficient of t1 in this problem is p(σ|σ) − p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯,σ)p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯,σ¯)p(σ|σ¯) = (2θ−1)νp(σ) > 0 and thus
the minimum is obtained when (A.9) is binding.49
Similarly, consider the following problem: for a given value T2 of p(σ¯|σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0
keeping both the LHS of (A.7) and the expected transfer unchanged, what is the value of
t2 minimizing the RHS of (A.6)? We solve:
min
{t2,t0}
p(σ¯|σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)t0
subject to
T2 = p(σ¯|σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0 (A.10)
t2 ≥ 0. (A.11)
This problem can be rewritten as:
min
{t2}
p(σ¯|σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)
p(σ|σ)(T2 − p(σ¯|σ)t2)
subject to (A.11).
The coefficient of t2 in this problem is p(σ¯|σ¯) − p(σ|σ¯)p(σ|σ)p(σ¯|σ) = (2θ−1)
2ν(1−ν)
p(σ¯)p(σ,σ)
> 0 and thus
the minimum is obtained when (A.11) is binding.50
49Note that the coefficient’s positivity does not depend on the signals being correlated. Therefore,
t1 = 0 would be optimal even in a model with uncorrelated signals.
50Note that the coefficient’s positivity does rely on the signals being correlated.
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With this in mind, the principal’s problem can be rewritten as:
min
{t¯,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ, σ)t0
subject to
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ p(σ|σ¯)t0 + ψ
p(σ¯)
, (A.12)
p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ ψ
p(σ)
. (A.13)
These two constraints define a cone in the positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space and the
optimum is reached at its extreme point. Simple manipulations complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: It is easily checked that U1,2 = (2−θ)ψ
(1−ν)(2θ−1)(1−θ) increases with
ν and U
2,2
U1,2
= 2(ν(1−θ)+(1−ν)θ)(1−θ)
θ(2−θ) decreases with ν. Hence, U
1,2 − 2U2,2 increases with ν.
Proof of Proposition 7: First, we show that t1 = 0 at the optimum. Given t2 = t0, the
moral hazard incentive constraints can be written as:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯|σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)t1 ≥ t0 + ψ
p(σ¯)
, (A.14)
and
t0 ≥ p(σ|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ¯|σ¯)t2 + ψ
p(σ¯)
. (A.15)
Adverse selection incentive constraints are obtained by suppressing the terms in ψ.
Clearly, for a given expected value of p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯|σ¯)t¯ + p(σ|σ¯)t1, setting t1 = 0 relaxes
(A.15). The last part of the proof is explained in the text.
Proof of Proposition 8: (26) can be written as two constraints defining a cone in the
positive quadrant of the (t0, t¯) space:
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0 + ψ
p(σ¯, σ¯)
, (A.16)
(1− p(σ¯, σ¯)− p(σ))t0 ≥ (p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)− p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯))t¯+ ψ. (A.17)
The optimum is reached at the cone’s origin.
Proof of Proposition 9: Decreasing t1 relaxes both (29) and (31) and increases the
principal’s payoff. Hence, (30) is binding and t1 = t2. Therefore (31) can be rewritten as:
θ2νt¯+ [θ(1− θ) + θ(1− ν) + (1− θ)ν]t2 − (1 + p(σ¯))ψ (A.18)
≥ max{t2, θνt¯+ [θ(1− ν) + (1− θ)ν]t2 − ψ}.
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This can in turn be rewritten as two constraints:
θ(1− θ)t2 ≥ θ(1− θ)νt¯+ p(σ¯)ψ (A.19)
θ2νt¯ ≥ [θν + (1− θ)(1− ν)− θ(1− θ)]t2 + (1 + p(σ¯))ψ (A.20)
Note that (A.19) is the same as (28) which is thus redundant. Thus, optimizing w.r.t. t¯
and t2, (A.19) and (A.20) must be binding. Solving this system completes the proof.
An Alternative Decision Rule
We now study the robustness of our results to changing the decision rule. Assume
now that the project is undertaken unless the expert reports bad news, i.e.,
νS¯ + (1− ν)S > 0 > ν(σ)S¯ + (1− ν(σ))S.
In the one-expert/one-signal case, the rent is as before, i.e., U1,1. Indeed, the moral hazard
incentive constraint remains:
p(σ)ν(σ)t+ p(σ)t0 − ψ ≥ max
{
t0, νt
}
,
implying the adverse selection constraints. Therefore t and t0 are as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 11 Suppose that the principal wants to undertake the project unless both
signals are negative, then the following holds under the optimal contracts.
• If one expert gathers both signals, his rent is:
U1,2 =
(1− p(σ¯, σ¯))ψ
θ(1− θ)(2θ − 1)(1− ν) > 2U
1,1. (A.21)
• If each of two experts gathers one signal, his rent is:
U2,2 =
p(σ)ψ
θ(2θ − 1)(1− ν) <
U1,2
2
. (A.22)
Consider first the one-expert/two-signals case. Since the project should be adopted
unless σ1 = σ2 = σ, adverse selection incentive compatibility implies the same transfer t¯
for all other reports. Other adverse selection constraints are:
ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯ ≥ t0, (A.23)
ν(σ¯, σ)t¯ ≥ t0, (A.24)
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and
t0 ≥ ν(σ, σ)t¯, (A.25)
where we have assumed that t = 0 which can be shown to be optimal.
Given the option to gather one or no signal, the moral hazard incentive constraint is:
(p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯) + 2p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ))t¯+ p(σ, σ)t0 − 2ψ ≥ (A.26)
max{t0, νt¯, p(σ¯) max{t0, ν(σ¯)t¯}+ p(σ) max{t0, ν(σ)t¯} − ψ}.
Under (A.24), the RHS above can be simplified as
max{νt¯, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 − ψ}.
As before, these constraints can be written as:
(θ2(1− ν) + (1− θ)2(1− ν))t0 ≥ ν(1− θ)2t¯+ 2ψ, (A.27)
and
θ(1− θ)νt¯ ≥ θ(1− θ)t0 + ψ. (A.28)
It is easily checked that (A.28) implies (A.23) and (A.24). Similarly, (A.27) implies (A.25).
The principal’s problem can thus be written as:
min
{t¯,t0}
(p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯) + 2p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ))t¯+ p(σ, σ)t0
subject to (A.27), (A.28) and t¯, t0 ≥ 0.
The first two constraints above are binding at the optimum and the optimal transfers are
νt¯1,2 = (1−p(σ¯,σ¯))ψ
θ(1−θ)(2θ−1)(1−ν) and t
1,2
0 =
(1+θ)ψ
θ(2θ−1)(1−ν) . The expert’s rent is:
U1,2 = νt¯ =
(1− p(σ¯, σ¯))ψ
θ(1− θ)(2θ − 1)(1− ν) . (A.29)
Now consider the two-experts/two-signals case. Given the decision rule to be imple-
mented, denote by t¯ the transfer offered to one expert when σˆ1 = σˆ2 = σ¯, t1 (resp. t2)
denotes the transfer to a favorable (resp. unfavorable) expert when the other is unfavor-
able (resp. favorable) and the project succeeds.51 Lastly, t0 denotes the transfer to an
expert when σˆ1 = σˆ2 = σ.
51It can be easily shown that the expert’s wage is zero if he recommends doing the project and it fails.
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The following adverse selection constraints must be satisfied:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ)t1 ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)t0, (A.30)
p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t1. (A.31)
Each expert’s moral hazard incentive constraint is:
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ 2p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ)(t1 + t2) + p(σ, σ)t0 − ψ (A.32)
≥ max{νt¯, p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t1 + p(σ)t0}.
As before, (A.32) as rewritten two constraints:
p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ)t1 ≥ p(σ¯|σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t2 + p(σ|σ¯)t0 + ψ
p(σ¯)
, (A.33)
p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t2 + p(σ|σ)t0 ≥ p(σ¯|σ)ν(σ¯, σ)t¯+ p(σ|σ)t1 + ψ
p(σ)
. (A.34)
Of course, (A.33) implies (A.30) and (A.34) implies (A.31).
The principal’s problem becomes:
min
{t¯,t1,t2,t0}
p(σ¯, σ¯)ν(σ¯, σ¯)t¯+ p(σ¯, σ)ν(σ¯, σ)(t1 + t2) + p(σ, σ)t0
subject to (A.33), (A.34), and t¯, t1, t2, t0 ≥ 0.
To find which limited liability constraint is binding, consider first the set of positive
transfers (t¯, t1) keeping constant the LHS of (A.33), i.e., θ
2νt¯ + θ(1 − θ)νt1, so that the
principal’s expected payoff is constant. All those transfer pairs also keep the RHS of
(A.34) unchanged and thus one can take t¯ = t1 without loss of generality.
Consider now the set of positive transfers (t1, t0) keeping constant the LHS of (A.34),
i.e., θ(1−θ)νt2+(θ2(1−ν)+(1−θ)2ν)t0, so that the principal’s expected payoff is constant.
Among those transfer pairs, the one minimizing the RHS of (A.33), i.e., θ2νt2 +θ(1−θ)t0,
is obtained for t2 = 0.
With t¯ = t1 and t2 = 0, (A.33) and (A.34) can be written as:
θνt¯ ≥ θ(1− θ)t0 + ψ, (A.35)
(θ2(1− ν) + (1− θ)2ν)t0 ≥ (1− θ)νt¯+ ψ. (A.36)
It is easily shown that the principal’s problem implies that both constraints above are
binding. This implies νt¯2,2 = p(σ)ψ
θ(2θ−1)(1−ν) and t
2,2
0 =
ψ
θ(2θ−1)(1−ν) . Each expert’s rent is
U2,2 = νt¯2,2 =
p(σ)ψ
θ(2θ − 1)(1− ν) . (A.37)
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Finally, U1,2 > 2U2,2 amounts to ν < θ
2
(2θ−1)2 . The RHS is minimum for θ = 1 and equals
1 so that this inequality always holds.
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ν(σ¯)t¯ = t0 +
ψ
p(σ¯)
t0 = νt¯
t0 = ν(σ)t¯+
ψ
p(σ)
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
Principal’s disutility
p(σ¯)ν(σ¯)t¯+ p(σ)t0 = k
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Set of incentive-feasible pairs (t0, t¯)
Figure: The set of incentive-feasible pairs (t0, t¯).
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